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Abstract:   Utilitarians, egalitarians, prioritarians, and sufficientarians each provide
examples of situations demonstrating, often compellingly, that a sensible ethical observer
must adopt their view and reject the others.    We argue, to the contrary, that an attractive
ethic is eclectic, in the sense of coinciding with these apparently different views in
different regions of the space of social states.
1 Departments of Political Science and Economics.1
1. Introduction
My aim is to study the ethics of distribution in very simple societies, ones
consisting of two people, whom I shall call A and B.   There are at least four distributional
ethics one might hold for these societies: egalitarian, prioritarian, utilitarian, or
sufficientarian.   I will explain these views precisely below.   Advocates of each of these
views often seem to have compelling arguments against the others, and this could be
taken to imply some kind of ￿impossibility theorem￿ for ethics.  I will argue, on the
contrary, that an attractive ethic requires that one hold all of these views in a restricted
way: depending upon the problem, ethics may require one to be an egalitarian or a
prioritarian, or something else.    Moreover, I hope to show that this eclectic view is
attractive, even within the narrow confines of a welfarist setting.
Welfarism is the view, first, that everything of value about a person￿s life can be
summed up in a number that measures his or her welfare, and that, second, a
distributional ethic need only rank possible distributions of welfare, in a population, to be
complete.   As I here adopt a welfarist framework, I am not concerned with the ￿equality-
of- what￿ debate, which focuses upon what features of the human condition should be the
objects of distributional concern.  A social state  in this paper will be an ordered pair of
welfare levels, u= (uA,uB), for A and B.   The domain of conceivable social states is the
set of all possible ordered pairs of non-negative numbers, called the non-negative orthant,
and denoted R+
2.
I identify four particular welfare levels for individuals:2
￿ the welfare level zero, associated with dying a horrible death (this is the
lowest possible welfare level);
￿ a welfare level b, associated with a comfortable death;
￿ a welfare level  ¢¢ b , associated with a death somewhat less than comfortable,
but not horrible;
￿ a welfare level  ¢ b , associated with a good life.
Clearly, ¢ b > b>¢ ¢ b > 0.
If a person has a welfare level greater than b, I say his life is worthwhile, or his
life is worth living; if a person has welfare level of  ¢ b  or greater, I say that she is
flourishing.  A person might sustain a welfare level of less than b, and be alive: he could
be enduring a state of pain that is worse than having a comfortable death.  Such
occurrences, of course, are the justification of euthanasia.
In this paper, ui  (with a subscript) will always indicate the welfare level of person
i, and u
j  (with a superscript) will always indicate a particular social state, that is, an
ordered pair of welfare levels.
2. Types of distributional ethic
A distributional ethic is a complete order on the set of possible social states, R+
2.
We denote the fact that state u
1 is ethically at least as desirable as the state u
2 in the usual
way: u
1fu
2.   The notation u
1 f u
2 is the strict preference relation.
It is convenient to represent preference orders by their indifference curve maps.
An indifference curve is a set of social states that are ethically indifferent, according to a
particular view.  An indifference curve map is a set of indifference curves associated with3
a particular view, with the property that every point in R+
2 lies on one and only one
indifference curve in the map.  An indifference curve map thus completely specifies an
observer￿s ethical preferences.
 I display four important types of preference order, by their indifference curve
maps, in Figure 1.
[p figure 1 abcd  about here]
Preferred social states always lie on ￿higher￿ indifference curves.
To understand how indifference curve maps work, we first introduce the idea of a
social situation.  A social situation is a set of social states, which are available in a
particular instance or problem.   We assume that one of these states must be chosen. For
example, the set T in figure 2, is a social situation.   (In economics, a social situation is
called a utility possibilities set.)
[Figure 2 here]
Suppose the social situation were T, and one￿s ethical preferences were given by
the indifference map illustrated in Figure 2.  Then the observer would choose the social
state p, that state in T which lies on the highest indifference curve that intersects T.
We can now explain the names of the preferences in Figure 1.  The preference
relation in Figure 1a is called egalitarian for the following reason.  Let T be a social
situation, illustrated in Figure 3a, and let e be the Pareto efficient point at which the 45
0
ray intersects the boundary of T. e is the equal-welfare point that has the highest  value
of welfare, among all equal-welfare points in T.  The rectangular preferences of Figure 1a
will always choose e, as long as e is Pareto efficient.4
Consider, now, the social situation S of Figure 3b.  Here, e is not Pareto efficient:
both individuals have higher welfare at point f above the 45
0 line on S￿s boundary.  In
this case, egalitarian preferences choose state f, the state that maximizes the minimum
welfare of the two individuals, in the set S.   So a more precise name for the rectangular
indifference map is ￿maximin￿ preferences.  They are the preferences associated with the
Rawlsian difference principle, although Rawls did not employ them in a welfarist setting.
Figures 3a and 3b
A number of philosophers, notably Temkin(1993), distinguish between radical
egalitarianism,  which always chooses the point e, Pareto efficient or not, and maximin.
I will not consider radical egalitarianism in this paper (because, within a welfarist
framework, I find it indefensible
2); I retain the description egalitarian for the rectangular
preferences of Figure 1a.
A prioritarian is one (after Parfit[1997]) who gives priority to the worse off.  I
take this to mean two things.  First, at any point in R+
2 that lies above the 45
0 line (that is,
a state in which A is the worse off), the absolute value of the slope of the indifference
curve is greater than one and at every point below the 45
0 line (that is, a state in which B
is the worse off), the absolute value of the slope is less than one.   Second, as we move
away from the 45
0- line along an indifference curve and above (below) the 45
0 line, the
slope increases (decreases) in absolute value.    The first property means that, in order to
increase the welfare level of the worse off person by a given increment, the ethical
2 I do not say radical egalitarianism is uninteresting, only that it is uninteresting given the axiom of
welfarism.  The reason that one might prefer strict equality among persons, with respect to some desirbable
attribute, rather than some unequal state in which everyone has more of that attribute, is that that attribute
does not summarize everything that is important to a person or a society.5
observer is always willing to trade-off a greater increment of welfare of the better off
person.  The second property means that the terms of this trade-off become increasingly
favorable to the worse off person, the greater is the inequality between the two  (in the
sense of distance from the 45
0line).
The indifference maps in Figures 1b and 1c are both prioritarian.  The difference
is that the extreme prioritarian of figure1b is willing to trade off arbitrarily large amounts
of the welfare of the better off person to obtain a given increment in the welfare of the
worse off person, as the latter approaches a welfare level of zero.    The moderate
prioritarian of figure 1c, however, places a bound on the degree of trade-off that is
permissible.   (Mathematically, this means that as we approach the vertical axis along an
indifference curve, the slope of the extreme prioritarian￿s indifference curve approaches
infinity, whereas the slope of the moderate prioritarian￿s indifference curve is bounded.)
Utilitarian ethics are illustrated in Figure 1d.  The effect of this indifference map
is always to choose the social state in a given situation which maximizes the sum of the
welfare levels of the two individuals. The trade-off between the welfare levels is always
one for one.
It is clear from Figure 1 that the egalitarian and utilitarian ethics are limiting cases
of prioritarianism: the egalitarian will accept any trade-off between welfare levels of the
better off and the worse off--  he would trade-off the welfare of the better off person
against a small gain for the worse-off person at an infinite rate.  The utilitarian, on the
other boundary, will never trade-off the better-off person￿s welfare at a rate greater than
one-for-one.6
While egalitarianism and utilitarianism are each well-defined distributive ethics
(that is, they each are associated with one indifference curve map), prioritarianism is a
very large family of ethics.   There are many families of indifference curves that are
prioritarian.
3. Distributional axioms
In this section, I propose some axioms on ethical preferences that I find attractive,
and consider the kinds of restriction they impose on ethics.
A1.  Ethical preferences are continuous.
To understand this axiom, we must first define the upper and lower contour sets
of a social state.   The upper (lower) contour set of state u,  under a given preference
order or ethic, is the set of all states that are weakly preferred
3 (dispreferred) to u.
Ethical preferences are continuous if  upper and lower contour sets of  every state are
closed sets.  This means the following.   Let {u
j | j =1,2,...} be a sequence of states, each
of which is in the upper contour set of u, which converges to a state u*.  Then u* is in the
upper contour set of u.  A similar statement must hold for lower contour sets.
Informally, continuity means that there are no ￿jumps￿ in the ethical preference
order.  (There would be a jump, if the limit point u* above were dispreferred to u.)
Continuity is not harmless: it eliminates the ￿leximin￿ preference order.  It is,however,
arguably an attractive property.
3 Weakly preferred means preferred or indifferent.7
A2. Ethical preferences are anonymous.
This means that ethical preferences take into account only the properties of the
social situation, not other (extraneous) characteristics of  A and B.  Of course, the social
situation can reflect the fact that , for example, A is handicapped and B is able; but
￿ableness￿ only counts to the extent that it is reflected in welfare levels.  The
mathematical formulation of anonymity is that the ethical indifference curves are
symmetric about the 45
0line.   Another way of saying this is that, if we rotate an
indifference curve about the 45
0 line as the axis, it turns into itself.   In particular, a social
state (a,c) is always indifferent to the social state (c,a).
A3a.  Ethical preferences are monotonic.








2).   Giving more
welfare to people is never ethically undesirable.
Closely related to monotonicity is:
A3b. (Weak Pareto efficiency) If a> x and c > y then (a,c)f (x,y).
Thus, if both persons have higher welfare in one state than in another, then the first state
is ethically preferred.  Without weak Pareto efficiency, we would not have indifference
curves, but perhaps indifference regions ￿ large sets of states all of which were mutually8
indifferent.  A3b  guarantees that the sets of indifferent states are indeed curves in the
plane.
Weak Pareto efficiency is the axiom that permits us to say that ￿higher￿
indifference curves are associated with increasing ethical desirability.
We do not insist on (strong) Pareto efficiency
4, because that would conflict with
continuity, given our other axioms.
A4.   Ethical preferences are weakly prioritarian.
Weak prioritarianism relaxes the requirement that the trade-off that the ethical
observer is willing to make, of the better-off person￿s welfare against the worse-off
person￿s welfare, is increasing as we move along an indifference curve away from the
45
0 line;   we replace increasing with non-decreasing. In particular, utilitarianism is
weakly prioritarian.
Weak prioritarianism eliminates preferences in which the better off person is
favored.
Next comes the first controversial axiom.
A5*. (triage)  There is a welfare level  ¢¢ b  < b such that the following holds.  Suppose a
social situation T in which either A can live a worthwhile life while B dies ￿quite
comfortably￿ (to be precise with a welfare level at least ¢¢ b ), or A and B both die.    Then
the first alternative is chosen.  Conversely, if in the first alternative described, the welfare
4 Pareto efficiency means if
a≥ x and c≥ y, with at least one equality strict then (a,c)f (x,y) .9
of B is c < ¢¢ b , and in the second alternative, both welfare levels are greater than or equal
to ¢¢ b , then the second alternative is chosen.
The situation described in the axiom is called triage because the axiom justifies
the practice that goes by that name on the battlefield.  When medical resources are scarce,
they are devoted not to the worst off, who would die even if treated, but only to those
who are less badly off, and can be saved.  Actually, A5* requires the battlefield nurse
first to administer morphine to those who will anyway die, to bring the quality of their
death up to  ¢¢ b .  After that, however, the nurse spends time treating only those who will
survive if treated, instead of, alternatively, spending time on the fatally wounded, to
extend their lives ( i.e., increase their welfare) by a small amount.    The last sentence in
A5* limits the jurisdiction of triage to cases in which those who are left to die are
reasonably comfortable.  One might also call A5* the lifeboat axiom: if a lifeboat can
only save one person, then straws should be drawn to determine who of A and B will
jump overboard.   (Alternatively, A and B could live for a few days longer in the boat, but
eventually both die.)
A5* is illustrated in Figure 4.  At state e, both persons die; at state f, B lives a
worthwhile life, and A dies quite comfortably, because her utility is greater than  ¢¢ b .
State f must be preferred to state e.  We see this rules out egalitarian preferences, which
would choose e.   (In particular, e is the Pareto efficient equal-utility point in T. )
Indeed, utilitarianism, moderate prioritarianism or extreme prioritarianism might
all choose f over e: only egalitarianism is surely ruled out by A4.10
It is because of its inconsistency with egalitarianism that triage is a controversial
axiom.
Next, I propose:
A6. (universal decency)  Suppose a social situation T where there is the possibility of
everyone￿s flourishing:
($(uA,uB)￿T)(ui ≥ ¢ b , for i = A,B).
Then a state where both people flourish must be chosen.
A6 rules out utilitarianism.  To see this , consult Figure 5.  Utilitarianism, when
faced with the situation T, chooses point g,  rather than some point, like f, on the arc CD,
the set of states at which both flourish.
figure 5 here
More interesting, however, is the following.  A6, A1, and A3 together imply that
the indifference curve through ( ¢ b , ¢ b ) is rectangular, as shown in Figure 6.
fig 6 here
To see this, consider the sequence of social states {u
j} illustrated by the series of points
in Figure 6 that converge to u.   By A6, ( ¢ b , ¢ b ) is preferred to every state u
j.  Therefore,
by continuity (A1), ( ¢ b , ¢ b ) must be preferred or indifferent to u.  But u is preferred or
indifferent to ( ¢ b , ¢ b ), by monotonicity (A3a).  Therefore u must be indifferent to ( ¢ b , ¢ b ).
This argument works for every point on the rectangular graph illustrated in Figure 6, and
so this graph is the indifference curve containing ( ¢ b , ¢ b ).11
Unfortunately, the axioms as they now stand are inconsistent.  To see this,
consider the indifference curve containing G=(b,b),  see Figure 7.    The indifference
curve through (b,b) cannot pass through the interior of triangle FGJ, for if it did, part of it
would have slope less than one in absolute value, which is forbidden by A4, since FGJ
lies above the 45
0 ray through the origin.  Therefore the indifference curve through point
G  passes above the segment GJ.   But that means that states in the triangle FGJ are
dispreferred to G. This directly contradicts A5.
Prioritarianism, in other words, is inconsistent with triage, as stated in A5*.  I
suggest that to make the axioms compatible, we weaken the triage axiom to:
A5.  (restricted triage)   Let T ={(c,d),(f,g)} where
min[c,d, f,g]≥ ¢¢ b   and max[d, f ,g]£ b.  If c is sufficiently large, then (c,d) is chosen.  If,
however, d <¢ ¢ b , or c  is not sufficiently large, then (f,g) is chosen.
In T of A5, only A  might live a worthwhile life in the first alternative, and both
die in the second alternative.  We prefer the first alternative only if A￿s life, at welfare
level c, is sufficiently good: in particular, for A5 to be consistent with A4, we must have
c > 2b-d, which guarantees that (c,d) lies above the triangle FGJ of Figure 7 .
Let us study the indifference curve through ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ).  The shaded region in figure
7 lies in the lower contour set of ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ), by A5.  On the other hand, points to the right of
segment EF all lie in the upper contour set of ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ), by monotonicity.  It follows, by
continuity, that all the points on the vertical ray  EF are indifferent to ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ).  By12
anonymity, the horizontal ray beginning at E=( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ) is also part of this indifference
curve.  Therefore the indifference curve containing ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ) is the rectangular curve HH,
of the ￿maximin￿ type.
It follows that an acceptable indifference curve through (b,b) is the bold curve
shown in Figure 7.  I have made this indifference curve ￿utilitarian￿ for a segment
containing(b,b), because that is the way to give triage the greatest strength.   However,
the indifference curve cannot intersect the lower indifference curve HH, so it must
eventually become asymptotic to HH or to some vertical line to the right of it: so it is not
￿utilitarian￿ throughout.
The axioms permit us to fill in the indifference map in a variety of ways in the
upper contour set of (b,b).
 I will not analyze what ethical preferences look like in the upper contour set of
( ¢ b , ¢ b ) , because I am not particularly interested in the ethics of distribution in a society
all of whose members are flourishing.   Distributional ethics are only important when it is
possible that some people might not flourish.  But because the indifference curve through
( ¢ b , ¢ b ) is rectangular, all indifference curves above ( ¢ b , ¢ b ) lie entirely in the region where
both individuals flourish, and so the problem of ethics, there, is (in my view)
unimportant.
Finally,  I discuss suffientarianism, which I take to be the doctrine advising the
ethical observer to ￿maximize the number of people who have enough￿ in any situation.13
A complete doctrine requires specifying what ￿enough￿ is; let me take it, here, to be the
property of living a worthwhile life, that is, having a welfare level greater than b.
AS. (Sufficientarianism) The conjunction of A6 and: If T contains a state in which at least
one person has welfare level greater than b, then such a state must be chosen.
Consult figure 8.    Four regions are labeled with the number of people who live
worthwhile lives in them.  It follows from AS that points in region 2 are preferred to
points in region 1, which are preferred to points in region 0.  Continuity implies that the
border between regions 0 and 1, the bold line, constitute one indifference curve and the
boundary between 1 and 2, drawn with a lighter line, constitutes another indifference
curve
5.  We have a contradiction: the point (b,b) cannot belong to two indifference
curves, and there is no way of solving this problem without violating continuity.  I
suggest that the sufficientarian relax continuity only at the point (b,b),  and assign (b,b) to
the lower indifference curve.   The indifference maps in the three regions can be
completed in a variety of ways.
figure 8 here
The indifference curve (in figure 8) on the common border of regions 0 and 1 is
an indifference curve from the family of ￿maximax￿ preferences: maximize the welfare of
5 The precise argument is as follows.  pick two states, P and Q on the bold line.  Now choose a sequence of
states {u
j} in the ￿zero￿ region converging to P, and a sequence of states {v
i} in the ￿one￿region
converging to Q.  Since every v
i is preferred to every u
j, by AS, it follows by continuity that Q is weakly
preferred to P.  Now choose a sequence of states {w
j} in the ￿one￿ region that converges to P, and a14
the best-off person.  We see, then, that despite what might appear to be a similarity
between the ethic of suffientarianism and the ethic of triage, they are quite different
views.   For triage, at least in our formulation, is not inconsistent with prioritarianism,
while sufficientarianism is.  The lower indifference curve in Figure 8 violates A4 in the
sharpest possible way: along it, the observer is willing to make extremely large trade-offs
of the welfare of the worse-off individual to increase the welfare of the better-off
individual by a small amount.   And continuity guarantees that a statement like this is also
true in the regions near this indifference curve.
The axioms A1 through A6 do not determine a unique ethic.  There are many
ways of filling in the indifference map that do not violate the axioms.
  One might wish to adopt:
A7.  Never let anyone die a horrible death, if possible.
A7 rules out weak prioritarianism.  It guarantees that the indifference curves
associated with very low levels of ethical desirability are asymptotic to the two co-
ordinate axes.   By continuity, it guarantees that the pair of co-ordinate axes comprise an
indifference curve ￿ the one associated with the least desirable states.  (In particular, the
state (0,0) is no less undesirable than states (c,0) or (0,c) with c>0:  it is no worse to let
both people die a horrible death than to let one die a horrible death.  This cannot be
avoided, without a violation of continuity.)
sequence of states{x
i} in the ￿zero￿ region that converges to Q.  The same argument implies, by
continuity, that P is weakly preferred to Q.   Hence, P must be indifferent to Q.15
In figure 9, I present an indifference curve map that is consistent with A1 through
A7.  The important point is that there are at least three indifference curves of the
egalitarian type: the ones containing (0,0), ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ), and ( ¢ b , ¢ b ).  By continuity, in the
regions near those curves, preferences are almost egalitarian
6.  The indifference curve
containing (b,b) has a section with slope equal to ￿1;  this is done in order to make triage
an axiom with some force.  Therefore, in the region near (b,b), preferences are very close
to being utilitarian.
In the regions between the three egalitarian indifference curves, we have a good
deal of freedom in how to fill in the map.  There could be other regions of egalitarianism,
for instance.  More generally, the indifference map can be of the extreme prioritarian
variety.  The three egalitarian curves demarcate three regions in which the behavior of
preferences are independent, because no two indifference curves ever cross.  Thus, we
can fill in the lower contour set of ( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ) in one way, the region between
( ¢¢ b , ¢¢ b ) and ( ¢ b, ¢ b ) in a second way, and the upper contour set of ( ¢ b , ¢ b ) in a third way.
4.  Conclusion
I hope to have shown that there is no inconsistency in an individual￿s holding a
distributive ethic which appears, sometimes, to be egalitarian, sometimes to be only
prioritarian, and sometimes in sharp conflict with egalitarianism, in the sense of
advocating triage.   Indeed, I believe that axioms like A1 through A7 (excluding AS) are
quite compelling, and so an attractive ethic demands that the ethical observer appear to
display these ￿inconsistencies.￿    My claim is that these ￿inconsistencies￿ are not true
6 This statement means: in a region close to those curves, the indifference map of figure 9 and the
egalitarian indifference map are almost indistinguishable.16
inconsistencies.   The precise resolution involves understanding that one￿s ethical
indifference curve map can ￿ and I would say must￿display quite different features in
different regions of the space of possible social states.
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